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A Procedural Approach to the Contract
Clause
The modern history of the contract clause' has been a history of balanc-
ing the rights of contractors against the demands of the state.2 This Note
argues that a balancing approach to the contract clause is undesirable as a
matter of policy and of constitutional law. By increasing judicial discre-
tion, balancing creates uncertainty in the law and undermines the integ-
rity of the legal system. Moreover, a balancing approach to the contract
clause is inconsistent with the Framers' intent and with the text of the
Constitution.
The Note proposes a procedural interpretation of the contract clause.
Under this proposal, judges would interpret the contract clause to allow
prospective changes in contract law by the legislature, but to prohibit all
retroactive impairments without payment of just compensation. The
Note's proposal would increase the chance that only impairments in the
1. The contract clause provides: "No State shall. . . pass any. . . Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 6.
2. The landmark balancing case is Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
There, the Supreme Court upheld an emergency moratorium on mortgage debts. The Court listed five
factors that legitimated the impairment despite the claim of unconstitutionality: (1) the existence of a
declared emergency; (2) the protection of a basic societal interest rather than particular individuals;
(3) the tailoring of the relief to the need it was designed to meet; (4) the presence of reasonable
conditions, such as the continuation of the mortgagors' interest obligations and the fact that most
mortgagees were corporations, whose chief concern was investment security; and (5) the limitation of
the legislation to the duration of the emergency. Id. at 444-48. Six years later, the Supreme Court
eliminated two of these factors and added another. See Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310
U.S. 32, 38 (1940) (relief need not be declared and relief measure need not be temporary; contract
was in area already subject to regulation); see also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S.
1, 26, 31 (1977) (adding as factors stricter scrutiny for public contracts and whether effect of contract
was foreseeable when formed).
Blaisdell and Veix were followed by a number of other balancing cases. See City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1965) (impairment of land purchaser's bargained-for right to rein-
statement held reasonable); East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945) (mortgage morato-
rium constitutional); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942) (reduc-
tion of municipal bondholders' rights constitutional).
Recent Supreme Court cases continue to reflect the Court's preference for balancing tests in inter-
preting the contract clause. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296, 2305 (1983) (upholding
Alabama law preventing oil producers from exercising their bargained right to pass on tax increases
as part of "inherent police power of the state 'to safeguard the vital interests of its people"') (citations
omitted); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697, 708 (1983) (uphold-
ing Kansas law limiting contractual right of natural gas producers to pass on price increases as insig-
nificant impairment, furthering "significant and legitimate state interests" in protecting consumers
from price rise caused by deregulation and in coordinating markets); Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1978) (clause "not . . . the Draconian provision that its words
might seem to imply" and it is "a commonplace that the contract clause does not . . . obliterate the
police power"); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977) ("The Contract Clause
is not an absolute bar to subsequent modifications of a State's own financial obligations. As with laws
impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment [of a public contract] may be constitu-
tional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.") (footnote omitted).
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public interest will be made. The Note concludes by considering the im-
plications of the proposal for corporate law.
I. THE BALANCING APPROACH TO THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
A. Contract Clause Jurisprudence Relies on Balancing Tests
Despite the absolute language of the contract clause, courts have not
recently interpreted the clause to prohibit all impairment of contracts.3
Instead, they have balanced contractors' private rights with the public in-
terest in a manner reminiscent of Lochner v. New York. 4 This use of bal-
ancing is central to the modern understanding of the contract clause.5
Their unanimous support for balancing is all the more striking in that
there is nothing in the text or history of the contract clause that suggests
that balancing is appropriate."
B. Policy Disadvantages of Contract Clause Balancing
The balancing approach to the contract clause allows judges excessive
discretion.7 This broad discretion is undesirable for policy reasons because
3. During the early nineteenth century, courts interpreted the contract clause as absolute. See
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 20 n.17 (1977) ("During the early years. . . the
contract clause was regarded as an absolute bar to any impairment."); Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 135-38 (1810) ("When. . . a law is
in its nature a contract, when absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of that law
cannot divest those rights. . . .") (emphasis added). During this period, the contract clause was the
basis of more Supreme Court decisions than any other constitutional clause. See B. SCHWARTZ, A
COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: PART II, THE RIGHTS OF PROP-
ERTY 267 (1965); B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION xiii (1938). The
clause's importance was captured by the British observer, Sir Henry Maine, who said:
I have seen the [the contract clause] criticised as if it were a mere politico-economic flourish;
but in point of fact there is no more important provision in the whole Constitution. . . . [Ilt
is this prohibition which has in reality secured full play to the economical forces by which the
achievement of cultivating the soil of the North American Continent has been performed; it is
the bulwark of American Individualism against democratic impatience and Socialistic fantasy.
H. MAINE, POPULAR GOVERNMENT 247-48 (1885).
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. For a time, it seemed that the Supreme Court Justices could agree on little besides the appro-
priateness of balancing. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (Both ma-
jority and dissent support balancing, but dissent charges majority with "fundamentally miscon-
ceiv[ing]" contract clause); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977) (same). But
see Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983) (unanimous Court upholding law nullifying
contractual obligation); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697 (1983)
(majority and concurrence in substantial agreement).
6. See infra pp. 922-25.
7. The test announced in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977), is
illustrative. There, the Court held that "an impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and
necessary to serve an important public purpose." Terms like "reasonable" or "important public pur-
pose" are so vague that they inevitably depend on the view of individual justices. See infra note 10 (in
Allied Structural Steel and United States Trust Co., conservative justices considered impairment un-
reasonable and public purpose minor, but liberal justices deemed impairment reasonable and public
purpose significant); see also infra note 53 (justices employ philosophical rather than technical con-
cepts). Discretion is not even limited by the requirement that an impairment be "necessary." Neces-
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it distorts the law. It undermines the process of overturning precedent.
Moreover, excessive discretion generates uncertainty, undermines the
goals of a written constitution, and impairs the rule of law.
Precedents should be overturned openly to ensure that the legal commu-
nity can scrutinize changes in the law. The contract clause balancing test,
however, permits judges to change the law without having to overrule past
decisions explicitly: Balancing allows judges to weigh competing values on
an ad hoc basis, which permits them to change the weight they give to
different values over time. In theory, of course, judges should decide bal-
ancing issues consistently: Two similar cases requiring balancing should
be decided in the same way. But since the contract clause balancing test
does not force judges to state their past decisions in the form of a rule,8
they are often able to evade these decisions. Judges have thus modified sub
silentio the law governing contract impairment.9
sity has no determinate meaning in this context because the state can always use its powers of eminent
domain or taxation. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 19 & n.16, 59 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("in virtually every decided Contract Clause case, the government could have exercised
. . . 'lesser alternative' of resorting to its power of taxation as a substitute for modifying . . .
contracts").
The Supreme Court will sometimes supplement these vague terms with more specific criteria. See
Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940) (contract in area already subject to
regulation); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934) (existence of declared
emergency). However, since the Court has changed these criteria so often, see supra note 2, their
contribution is marginal.
8. Even though this Note employs exacting standards in assessing judicial interpretation, it does
not assume an unrealistic or mechanistic view of legal interpretation. The feasibility of rule-based
interpretation might be illustrated by imagining the following spectrum of legal forms. Laws at one
end of the spectrum are clear enough to be applied mechanically. Laws in the center of the spectrum
are still rules, but require interpretation: The words of the rules must be defined more clearly and
applications must be made apparent. At the far end of the spectrum lies balancing. Here, the law is so
vague as to be no more than a list of values to be weighed by the judges.
This Note assumes the law in the center of the spectrum, not at the far (mechanistic) end. It thus
recognizes that meaning must be given to the words of the contract clause. The definition, for exam-
ple, of "obligation," "impairment," or even "law" is of crucial importance. Thus, even an absolutist
approach leaves room for some judicial interpretation. However, since words can be interpreted in
terms of rules-e.g., an obligation always refers to an existing contract-judicial interpretation need
not involve ad hoc balancing. See also Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
COLJm. L. REV. 1022, 1027 (1978) (distinguishing "interpretive balancing," which is consistent with
rule-based law, from ad hoc balancing, which is not).
9. The Court's enthusiasm for the contract clause has fluctuated significantly, but the Justices still
write as if their holdings under the clause are consistent. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
438 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1978) (deriving principles of contract clause jurisprudence from Blaisdell and
El Paso); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1977) (same). This position is
extraordinary since the various holdings under the clause cannot be reconciled: Many of the contract
clause cases reflect the eras in which they were written. See infra note 12. Handed down during the
Great Depression, Blaisdell was a five-to-four decision that reluctantly upheld a statute permitting
mortgagors to remain in their houses a few extra months if they compensated the mortgagees with
reasonable rental value. The statute was justified as a temporary measure pursuant to a declared
emergency, and it is not clear that any actual damages were suffered by the mortgagees. El Paso, on
the other hand, was an eight-to-one decision made in the prosperous mid-1960's. There, the Court
upheld a Texas statute depriving land purchasers, without compensation, of their bargained-for right
to reinstatement. The rationales for upholding the impairment-clarification of land titles, elimination
of litigation, and effective use and utilization of property-seem relatively trivial compared to the
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The contract clause balancing test also interferes with the ordering
function of the law. Individual judges exercise their broad discretion
under the contract clause balancing test differently.10 Because no one can
predict who will judge any particular case, the balancing test creates un-
necessary uncertainty and denies notice, making it difficult for people to
plan and order their lives."'
Paradoxically, the judicial discretion allowed by the contract clause bal-
ancing test may also restrain judicial independence, for it eliminates one of
the judges' most effective shields against prevailing opinion-legal cer-
tainty. Because judges cannot plausibly argue that their unpopular con-
losses suffered by the contractors. The true motivation for the impairment was suggested by Justice
Black: "At most the Court's reasons boil down to the fact that Texas' contracts. . . turned out. . . to
be costly . . . . The State decided it had made a bad deal and wanted out." City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 352 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Blaisdell and El Paso reveal very different
judicial attitudes toward the contract clause. In Blaisdell, the Court considered upholding an impair-
ment a serious course of action to be pursued only in support of very important social values, whereas
in El Paso the Court was almost frivolous in its consideration of the importance of judicial protection
of contract rights. The Court gave no indication that the law had changed.
The Court changed its interpretation of the contract clause again in 1977. In United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977), it indicated that impairments of a state's own contracts would
face more stringent examination since a state's self-interest was at stake. Id. at 26; see also Exxon
Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296, 2306 (1983) (noting stricter scrutiny appropriate for impairments
of public contracts); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697, 705 n.14
(1983) (same). This willingness to look beyond the government's stated purpose differs radically from
the Court's deferential attitude in El Paso.
10. Two recent contract clause cases, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977),
and Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), illustrate the point. The conserva-
tive justices seemed to favor contract rights while liberal justices did not. In Spannaus, the majority
thought "the effect of. . . [the impairment] was severe, . . . in an area where the element of reliance
was vital." Id. at 246 (Stewart, J.) (joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Rehnquist & Stevens, JJ.). The
dissent, in contrast, claimed that "the Act does not impose 'sudden and unanticipated' burdens...
[and] will impose only minor economic burdens on employers whose pension plans have been ade-
quately funded." Id. at 253-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by White & Marshall, JJ.). The
Justices also disagreed as to the importance of the purposes achieved by the Act. The dissenters wrote,
"The Act. . . was designed to remedy a serious social problem," id. at 252, but the majority stated
"not only did the Act have an extremely narrow aim, but also its effective life was extremely short,"
id. at 248 n.21.
In United States Trust Co., the majority described the statute as working a "drastic impairment,"
id. at 31 (Blackmun, J.) (joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist & Stevens, JJ.). The dissenters consid-
ered the impairment to cause only "the most minimal damage on the part of the Authority's bond-
holders." Id. at 41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by White & Marshall, JJ.). Referring to the
purpose of the statute, the dissenters wrote that it responded to "serious and growing environmental,
energy, and transportation problems," id. at 38, while the majority stated that the "changes [in these
problems] . . . were of degree and not of kind," id. at 32.
11. See L. Fu1LER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-62 (1971); F. HAYEK, THE CONsOrrrrON OF
LIBERTY 133-61 (1960). Since contracts are one of the main instruments by which individuals can
create order in society, uncertainty as to the law of contracts is particularly harmful. By increasing the
cost of contracting, uncertainty discourages mutually beneficial exchanges and thus harms rich and
poor alike. Uncertainty does not even promote distributional goals. If the courts attempted to use their
discretion to aid the poor, such attempts would soon prove to be counterproductive, since contractors
would add a risk premium equal to their expected loss from the impairment to any contracts they
made with poor people. See Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CoNTRACT LAW 91-92 (A. Kronman & R. Posner eds. 1979). But see Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1685, 1777-78 (1976).
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tract clause decisions are compelled by the rigors of a clear legal rule,
judges will have greater difficulty in standing firm against popular trends
that threaten constitutional values.12 It is the purpose of a written consti-
tution-and in America, of the judiciary that interprets the Constitu-
tion-to stand as an impediment to such trends.3 It is the nature of bal-
ancing tests to encourage them.
Finally, the contract clause balancing test undermines the legitimacy of
the judicial process, which asks judges to make retrospective decisions
about particular known individuals. In contrast, legislators render pro-
spective decisions for large classes of people. 4 The judicial enterprise thus
allows judges more opportunity to act out of bias than legislators; accord-
ingly, many safeguards exist to limit the discretion of individual judges.15
No such safeguard is more important than the requirement that judges
decide cases in accordance with rules. This requirement helps to ensure
that standards of justice are applied universally and consistently, and lim-
its the ability of judges to act out of bias since judges know that their
rulings will apply in cases not yet in court to parties they cannot foresee.
By enabling judges to circumvent the requirement of rules with ad hoc
decisions, the contract clause balancing test undermines this important
safeguard.1
12. Cf Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10
(1959) (lack of discretionary jurisdiction in Marshall Court protected constitutional values against
popular sentiments). Notably the landmark balancing case, Blaisdell, was decided during the Great
Depression, when belief in private ordering was at its lowest. Similarly, the El Paso decision of the
mid-1960's reflects that era's faith in the fairness and efficacy of government. More recent cases,
which place greater value on contract rights, see Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United
States Trust Co. 431 U.S. 1 (1977), coincide with a general turn toward conservative values.
13. See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865, 870 (1965) (arguing that Bill of Rights
be interpreted in absolute terms). Both interpretivists and noninterpretivists accept the importance of
an independent judiciary. See id. at 869-70 (independent judiciary limits arbitrary government); Fiss,
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11-17
(1979) (suggesting that judges are qualified to interpret conflicting values in Constitution since they
are independent of politics and democratic decisionmaking). But see Wellington, Common Law Rules
and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 265-80
(1973) (advocating constitutional interpretation based upon popular moral standards).
14. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONAL LAW §§ 10-1 to 10-18, at 474-519 (1978); Com-
ment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause,
72 YALE L.J. 330, 347 (1962). Unfortunately, legislative decisionmaking is not prospective and gen-
eral enough to ensure decisionmaking in the public interest. John Hart Ely's theory of judicial review
is based upon the failure of legislators to make fully general decisions. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISRusr 80-102 (1980). This Note also attempts to improve the generality and prospectivity of
legislative decisionmaking. See infra pp. 925-29.
15. The rights to a jury's determination of facts and to disqualify biased judges are both mecha-
nisms that limit a judge's ability to act improperly.
16. The separation of powers is also undermined when judges decide cases without reference to
clear rules. The doctrine of separation of powers presumes that laws exist which the judiciary cannot
easily alter. See F. HAYmE, supra note 11, at 210-12. Balancing under the contract clause provides
judges with such unlimited discretion that they can in effect exercise both the judicial and legislative
power at once.
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C. Constitutional Arguments Against Balancing
The contract clause balancing test suffers from constitutional as well as
policy defects. Those defects are manifest whether one looks to the consti-
tutional text or the Framers' intent. To treat the contract clause as analo-
gous to the doctrine of "substantive due process" is also a mistake.
1. Constitutional Text and the Intent of the Framers
Since the text of the contract clause relies on absolute language, it sug-
gests that balancing should not be employed, and early courts viewed the
clause as an absolute prohibition on contract impairment.1 7 Some constitu-
tional clauses, in contrast, do suggest the appropriateness of balancing:
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures,"' "s and the Eighth Amendment guarantees that "excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed." 19 Had the Framers
intended balancing under the contract clause, they could have prohibited
only unreasonable impairments.20 Since they failed to do this, however,
the Court's use of balancing would appear to result from an incorrect
interpretation.
Historical evidence also indicates that the Framers did not intend to
create a balancing test under the contract clause.21 Madison considered
impairments of contract to be a great evil: "[L]aws impairing the obliga-
17. See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 3), 57 H~Av. L. REv. 852,
872-74 (1944); supra note 3.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
20. This argument parallels that of Justice Black concerning the First Amendment. See Black,
supra note 13 (advocating absolutist approach to constitutional interpretation); see also City of El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (suggesting that contract clause is
absolute bar to impairment of contracts). Even though the First Amendment employs absolute lan-
guage, absolute interpretations have been criticized as unworkable. See J. ELY, supra note 14, at
109-10; Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17
VAND. L. REv. 479 (1964). But see J. ELY, supra note 14, at 110-16 (proposing interpretation of
First Amendment that circumvents difficulties of an absolute approach, but also avoids the dangers of
ad hoc balancing). According to Professor Tribe, the Supreme Court employs ad hoc balancing only
when "a government regulation is aimed at the noncommunicative impact of an act." L. TRIBE, supra
note 14, § 12-2, at 582. The absolute approach advocated in this Note is here applied only to the
contract clause. Even if absolute approaches should prove unworkable in other areas of constitutional
jurisprudence, it is significant that balancing is unnecessary under the contract clause. Two features of
the contract clause particularly suit it to an absolute interpretation. First, the clause protects only
existing contracts. The states can therefore regulate contract law prospectively. See infra pp. 925-28.
The First Amendment, however, prevents the government from abridging free speech with either
prospective or retroactive laws. Second, because contracts are a form of property, the states can impair
if they pay just compensation. See infra pp. 928-29; pp. 933. Government restriction of speech, how-
ever, is more difficult to cure with damage payments.
21. W. HUNTING, THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION 119 (1919) (suggesting that "Madison admitted that inconveniences might arise from such a
prohibition, but thought these overbalanced by the utility of it"); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at
266-67 (1965).
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tion of contracts . . . are contrary to the first principles of the social com-
pact and to every principle of sound legislation."22 Moreover, discussion
of the clause at the time of its ratification2" assumed that it would operate
absolutely.2
2. The False Analogy to Substantive Due Process
Another constitutional problem with the contract clause balancing test
is that it has relied on a false analogy to substantive due process. During
the Lochner era, the Court viewed both the contract clause and the due
process clause as involving the balancing of economic rights with the pub-
lic interest.2" Commentators accepted this view and considered the con-
tract clause to duplicate substantive due process.
26
The discrediting of economic due process 27 therefore greatly influenced
the Court's reading of the contract clause. If judges could no longer decide
cases involving economic rights asserted under the due process clause, how
could they decide such cases under the contract clause? In this fashion, the
false analogy to substantive due process reduced scrutiny under the con-
tract clause to little more than rational-relation review.
28
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
23. See id. at 282-83. Luther Martin, a delegate to the Federal convention, opposed the clause
because he believed its absolute effect would be too inflexible. Martin believed
that there might be times of such great public calamities and distress . . . as should render it
the duty of a government, for the preservation of even the most valuable part of its citizens, in
some measure to interfere in their favour, by passing laws totally or partially stopping the
courts of justice, or authorizing the debtor to pay by installments . . . . I therefore voted
against depriving the States of this power, a power which I am decided they ought to possess,
but which, I admit, ought only to be exercised on very important and urgent occasions.
B. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis omitted). The last sentence suggests that Martin might
have favored a balancing test. Modern courts have ignored the fact that Madison's views, not Mar-
tin's, prevailed at the Constitutional Convention.
24. An absolute reading of the clause does not cripple the powers of government for which the
Framers provided. Although the clause is not limited by a balancing requirement, it is restricted in
other ways. The clause applies only to action by the states and not by the federal government, and to
retroactive but not prospective impairment. The Framers left room for governmental action, but, as
always, they imposed restrictions upon it.
25. See Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914) ("neither the 'contract' clause
nor the 'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power of the State to establish all regula-
tions that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare
of the community") (emphasis added); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (contract
clause does not restrain police power).
26. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 306 (suggesting that decline of substantive due process has
left contract clause as "fifth wheel to the Constitutional Law coach"); Hale, supra note 17, at 890-91
("But the results might be the same if the contract clause were dropped out of the Constitution, and
the challenged statutes all judged as reasonable or unreasonable deprivations of property.").
27. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
28. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 61 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(in "recent times, however, this Court wisely has come to embrace a coherent, unified interpretation of
all such constitutional provisions [protecting property and contract rights], and has granted wide lati-
tude to 'a valid exercise of [the States'] police powers,' . . . even if it results in severe violations of
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The Court's analogy between the contract clause and substantive due
process, however, is incorrect. The contract clause provides explicit textual
protection of contract rights; the due process clause does not. Thus, the
usual criticism that substantive due process involves judicial usurpation of
legislative power29 does not apply to the contract clause.30 The discredit-
ing of substantive due process should not, therefore, have limited rights
under the contract clause.31
II. THE PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
The contract clause balancing test falls both on policy grounds and as a
matter of constitutional law. This Note's proposal would eliminate the
problems of the current balancing test. The Note interprets the contract
clause to protect against all retroactive, uncompensated impairments. New
laws that impair existing contracts are thus unconstitutional, but victims
of contract impairments cannot enjoin enforcement of the impairment if a
state chooses to pay damages. States retain the flexibility to impair retro-
actively, so long as they pay just compensation.
The Note also interprets the contract clause to permit the states to reg-
ulate contract law prospectively.3 2 The states should be able to make cer-
tain types of contracts illegal and impose limits on others. The clause does
not, however, incorporate freedom of contract into the Constitution. The
maximum hours statute at issue in Lochner v. New York,3 3 for example,
would be constitutional to the extent that it applied to future contracts.
property right") (citations omitted; emphasis added); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421, 423-25 (1952) (treating contract clause as duplicating due process clause); see also Energy
Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 103 S. Ct. 697, 705-06 (1983) (when private contracts
are involved, "once a legitimate public purpose has been identified.. . 'as is customary in reviewing
economic and social regulation ... courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of a particular measure") (citations omitted).
29. See J. ELY, supra note 14, at 4-5; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
30. Disagreements over the due process analogy would seem to explain Justice Black's dissent in
El Paso, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965). Given the majority's deference to the state legislature, id. at
512-14, it must have viewed the case as one fitting the model of economic due process. Justice Black,
in contrast, read the contract clause as a separate provision in the Constitution.
31. Although this Note interprets the Constitution to protect certain economic rights, it avoids the
pitfalls of "Lochnerizing" or of substantive due process. The interpretation presented below is based
on values of process, is firmly rooted in the constitutional text, and does not involve judicial balancing.
See infra pp. 934-35.
32. The Supreme Court has always interpreted the contract clause to allow prospective changes in
contract law. See B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 273. In Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827), the
Court held that the contract clause applied only to retroactive impairments. Chief Justice Marshall, in
dissent, argued that the Court's holding would undermine the clause since the states could now pro-
spectively pass a law reserving the right to control all contracts. Id. at 355. This Note's procedural
approach, however, forbids the states from reserving such impairment power. See supra p. 934-35.
33. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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A. Policy Arguments for the Procedural Approach
Legislators sometimes harm minority interests even when such harm is
unnecessary for the general welfare. Requiring legislators to pass only
prospective and general laws reduces the frequency of such unnecessary
harm." The Framers implicitly recognized this by including several pro-
visions in the Constitution that impose requirements of prospectivity and
generality in legislation."5 The contract clause should be interpreted as
one such provision.36 The procedural approach3 7 to the contract clause,
with its requirements of generality and prospectivity, is therefore desirable
policy: It increases the chances that only impairments in the public inter-
est will be made.
1. Improved Legislative Decisionmaking
The power to impair can be used for good or ill: A legislature might
impair a contract to promote the general welfare or merely to benefit the
politically powerful. The policy problem posed by the contract clause,
therefore, is how to permit legitimate impairments while prohibiting ille-
gitimate ones. This problem is addressed through a variety of mechanisms.
The procedural approach permits prospective changes in contract law
because majorities 5 are better able to abuse minorities with retroactive
34. F. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 3-21 (1979); F. HAYEK, supra note 11, at
205-20.
35. See J. ELY, supra note 14, at 88-100; infra pp. 932-33.
36. Curiously, John Hart Ely, the leading exponent of procedural interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, argues that the contract clause is substantive rather than procedural. Ely argues that the best
explanation for the clause is that "the framers and ratifiers meant to single out for special protection
from the. . . state political processes a substantive value." J. ELY, supra note 14, at 91-92 (emphasis
omitted). If the clause is interpreted to apply only to retroactive impairments, that substantive value is
a "reliance interest, an assurance that by entering into a contract one can render oneself immune from
future shifts in the identity or thinking of one's elected representatives." Id. at 92. Ely assumes,
however, that the remedy for a contract impairment is an injunction, not damages, as is clear from his
remarks concerning the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment:
On first reading, the Fifth Amendment. . . may appear simply to mark the substantive value
of private property for special protection from the political process. . . . [B]ut note that prop-
erty is not shielded from condemnation by this provision. On the contrary, the amendment
assumes that property will sometimes be taken and provides instead for compensation. Read
through it thus emerges. . . as yet another protection of the few against the many, "a limit on
government's power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to the general good." Its point
is to "spread the cost of operating the governmental apparatus throughout the society rather
than imposing it upon some small segment of it."
Id. at 97 (footnotes omitted). These arguments apply to this Note's interpretation of the contract
clause, which requires just compensation to those affected by retroactive impairments. Such a contract
clause is thus procedural.
37. This theory of the contract clause is procedural in two senses. First, it does not interpret the
clause to protect a substantive value (e.g., freedom of contract). The Notes interpretation of the clause
instead allows the states to choose among any number of substantive conceptions of contract law.
Second, the theory is concerned with the process of legislative decisionmaking: Decisions to impair are
upheld so long as they are made prospectively and generally.
38. While for convenience the Note speaks of the majority exploiting minorities, powerful and
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statutes than with prospective ones. Retroactive legislation enables deci-
sionmakers to know which contracts an impairment will harm. In con-
trast, it is more difficult to predict which contracts will be affected by
prospective legislation. 9
In addition, the requirement of prospectivity inhibits majority tyranny
by giving minorities notice that certain contracts are invalid. While a pro-
spective change in contract law may eliminate a contractor's most profita-
ble opportunity, it at least leaves that contractor free to make alternative
exchanges. Retroactive impairments, however, operate on contracts made
in reliance on existing law. Under current doctrine, the investments in
those contracts are resources available for expropriation by politically
powerful groups.
40
The dangers posed by retroactive impairments can, however, be greatly
reduced if the state compensates the victims of such impairments.4 1 The
compensation requirement directly prevents majorities from imposing the
costs of impairments on only a small section of the population. These costs
must be borne instead by the general public as taxpayers. The impair-
ment will thus be seen as a burden on everyone and will be made only if
its overall benefits exceed its costs.
These provisions requiring generality and prospectivity serve the public
interest in two ways. First, they encourage legislators to perform their
function as it was traditionally conceived and to evaluate laws from the
perspective of the common good.42 Because it is difficult to predict the
harmful effects of a prospective change in contract law, more people will
fear these effects than will actually be harmed by them. Similarly, more
people will anticipate that a change in law might benefit them. This dif-
fusion of benefits and costs discourages legislators from evaluating laws
from an interest-group perspective. With the boundaries between groups
blurred, a legislator will have a greater incentive to consider the populace
as a single group and to rely on his genuine opinions about that group's
well organized special interests may exploit the majority as well. See M. OLsEN, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECVE ACTION 63-65 (1965).
39. Cf. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (using ignorance in "original position"
to ensure fairness of outcome to all).
40. For example, bondholders' investments might be expropriated by a change in the terms of the
indenture. Cf. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (legislation repealing bond
covenant unconstitutional impairment).
41. If 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) applied to impairments of contracts, a damage remedy would
already exist. Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (discussing "prerequisites for recovery of
damages" by public school children deprived of due process). Section 1983, however, has been inter-
preted not to apply to rights asserted under the contract clause. See Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp.
838, 841-42 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Pudlik v. Public Serv. Co., 166 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D. Colo. 1958).
42. See J. ELY, supra note 14, at 78-88; F. HAYEK, supra note 11, at 8-13, 20-21; G. WiLus,
EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 223 (1981) (discussing Madison's disapproval of represen-
tation of specific interests).
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interest. While policy disagreements will still exist, the nature of these
disagreements between legislators will turn on different conceptions of the
public interest. This is preferable to a situation in which disagreements
turn instead on which interest groups will be affected.43
Second, the procedural approach promotes legislation that creates more
benefits than costs. Majority rule will only produce such legislation if ma-
jorities are not allowed to create small benefits for themselves by imposing
large costs upon minorities.4 ' By making it more difficult for majorities to
identify and burden the victims of impairments, the requirements of pros-
pectivity and generality tend to prevent such redistributions. 5
2. Policy Advantages of the Damage Remedy
A damage remedy is superior to an injunction because damages provide
the states with the flexibility to impair contracts retroactively when the
benefits exceed the costs. So long as the victims of contract impairments
are made whole through compensation,"6 there is little reason to grant
43. The situation where a majority can exploit a minority may be described as a political exter-
nality: The majority does not bear the full costs of its behavior. Cf. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUsT
PARADOX 114 (1978) (defining economic externality as "[elconomic activity [that] creates social costs
. . . not taken into account by the price system"). There is an interesting contrast between political
and economic externalities. Economic externalities will not arise if the benefits and costs of an activity
are fully concentrated in a decisionmaker. See C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTER-
EsTs 30-31 (1978). Political externalities, however, may be solved by diffusing the benefits and costs
of collective action. In this way, no group is given opportunity to exploit another: Private benefits
cannot be acquired without also producing public benefits and costs cannot be imposed only on some.
This solution is required in the political sphere because there is no way of fully concentrating the
benefits and costs of collective action on a particular group; and thus some mechanism for tying to-
gether the interests of different groups is necessary. In this respect, the diffusion of benefits and costs
is an attempt to create an effect similar to what Rawls calls chain connection. See J. RAwLS, supra
note 39, at 80. Nozick also suggests a way of tying together the interests of individual actors-the
reciprocal ownership of shares in one another. R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 180-90
(1974).
44. Cf Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399, 407
(1978) (discussing connection between democracy and utilitarianism); Bork, supra note 29, at 9-11
(discussing connection between democracy and "equal gratification principle").
45. The root idea has an analogy in welfare economics. Majority rule, limited by the contract
clause as here interpreted, will produce only Kaldor-Hicks optimal changes. See generally Coleman,
Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF.
L. REV. 221, 239-40 (1980) (defining Kaldor-Hicks efficient changes as those in which "the position
of winners has been improved more than the position of losers has been worsened," as measured by
consumers' willingness to pay). Majority rule unconstrained by the procedural approach to the con-
tract clause, however, will often result in suboptimal changes under the Kaldor-Hicks standard. This
does not make the procedural approach Kaldor-Hicks optimal in any technical sense. For example,
the argument in the text ignores intensity of preferences, an issue that an efficiency claim should
address. Nor does this imply that the public interest is merely a matter of efficiency.
46. The damage remedy for a breach of contract differs from the damage remedy for an impair-
ment. In a breach, it is one of the parties who prevents the contract from being realized; in an
impairment, it is the state, an external party, which interferes with the contract. As a result, the law
of contract damages may not be very useful in developing the details of a damage remedy for impair-
ment. A more appropriate analogy to contract impairment is the tort of interference with contract.
This tort involves a third party's preventing two contractors from fulfilling their contract. See gener-
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those victims an injunctive remedy.47 In this respect, the damage remedy
for impairments resembles the just compensation requirement for govern-
mental takings of private property.4 Both requirements help to insure
that property will be taken only when the taking is in the public inter-
est.49 In addition, elementary fairness requires that if the public benefits
from an impairment, the public, rather than the individual victims, should
bear the costs of those benefits.50
3. The Reduction of Judicial Discretion Through the Procedural
Approach
The procedural approach would also eliminate much of the undesirable
discretion that judges presently exercise under the contract clause balanc-
ally W. PIOSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 927-49 (1971) (discussing tort of
interference with contract).
47. Cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 4.9, 4.12, at 88-89, 95-96 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that damage remedy for breach of contract serves efficiency). But cf. Schwartz, The Case for
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (specific performance preferable to contract damages).
48. The just compensation clause provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 9-4, at 463 (discussing compensation requirement as an at-
tempt to limit arbitrary sacrifice of few to many); R. POSNR, supra note 47, at § 3.5, at 41 (compen-
sation requirement limits takings to circumstances when property owner values property less than
government). Because the contract clause does not prevent the states from exercising the power of
eminent domain on contracts, see West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532-33
(1848); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 296, one might question the need for an independent damages
remedy. A damages remedy is nonetheless necessary to serve the purposes that allow states to impair
contracts in the first place. Eminent domain requires that the state initiate a proceeding in order to
condemn property, see 6 P. NIcHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 24.11-.113 (rev. 3d ed.
1983), while the damages remedy has the harmed contractors bring an action themselves. The dam-
ages remedy is superior in this respect since contractors know who has been impaired better than does
the state. Eminent domain, moreover, requires that damage determinations occur before the statute
works its impairments, id., while the damages remedy measures damages after the impairment. Again,
the damages remedy is superior because the courts can estimate damages better after the impairment
than before. The damages remedy is thus a more appropriate way of insuring that all victims of
impairments are compensated but that the state pays for no more than the actual damages suffered.
Moreover, statutes that impair retroactively are often needed immediately-or the state could have
exempted prior contracts-but eminent domain proceedings may delay the operation of the statute.
50. See L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 9-4, at 463; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165,
1218-24 (1967). Another advantage of the damage remedy is that it provides the courts with the
flexibility to focus on the real issue in a case while also preserving decisionmaking in accordance with
rules. In Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), for example, a contract was
impaired by a debt moratorium that permitted defaulting mortgagors to remain in their houses for a
short period if they paid reasonable rental value. While this statute impaired the original mortgage
contracts, the mortgagees thereby suffered little or no damage. Had the contract clause been inter-
preted to require only a damages remedy, the court could have held the statute to be an impairment,
secure in the knowledge that the state could easily have paid for the minimal damages suffered. In the
absence of a damages remedy, however, the Court was led to uphold the statute by in effect reinter-
preting the contract clause to bar only unreasonable impairments. Id. at 444-47. This reasonableness
test has since been used to permit much more significant impairments. See supra note 2. Thus, to
avoid the rigidity of an injunction, the Court set a precedent that later courts have used to undermine
contractual expectations and the Constitution.
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ing test.5 1 Because the procedural approach employs a clear rule, it cir-
cumvents the ad hoc decisionmaking characteristic of balancing. Courts
using the procedural approach would not weigh the benefits of an impair-
ment against its costs, but would merely determine if an impairment had
occurred. 52 Moreover, the procedural approach is framed in precise, non-
political terms. Balancing tests, on the other hand, require that judges
orient their decisions around more political and philosophical concepts.
53
Such indeterminate concepts lead judges to consult their political
prejudices.54
The procedural approach would not, of course, result in errorless judi-
cial interpretation. The compensation requirement means that the courts
must calculate the damages caused by an impairment rather than just is-
suing an injunction. Nonetheless, calculating damages is an activity for
which judges and juries have long been well-suited. Judges will also have
51. See supra 919-22.
52. In this respect, the difference between an absolute interpretation of the contract clause and the
current balancing jurisprudence parallels the old controversy in antitrust law about whether or not
judges should weigh the costs of a system of competition. In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), Judge Taft rejected the view that
the judge's role was to consider "how much restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how
much was not" because such an inquiry would set the courts on "a sea of doubt." See generally R.
BORK, supra note 43, at 26-30 (discussing Addyston). In the jurisprudence of the contract clause, the
balancing of individual and state rights has likewise set the courts on such a sea. The procedural
approach would help to anchor them.
53. In assessing the harm caused to victims of impairments, for example, the Justices have supple-
mented the technical criterion of damages suffered with evaluations of meritorious behavior, see Allied
Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 231, 254 (1978) (impairment "will impose only minor eco-
nomic burdens on employers whose pension plans are adequately funded") (emphasis added), and of
reliance, see id. at 246 (impairment "severe . . . in an area where reliance was vital") (emphasis
added); see also supra note 10 (Justices' disagreements in Allied Structural Steel and United States
Trust Co. result from differing evaluations of competing social ends).
54. A comparison of this Note's procedural approach with an application to the contract clause of
Ely's participation-reinforcing theory of judicial review is instructive. See J. ELY, supra note 14.
Although both approaches attempt to improve the processes of legislative decisionmaking, only the
procedural approach defines a judicial role that acceptably limits discretion. Applying the participa-
tion-reinforcing theory to the contract clause requires courts to "scrutinize the manner in which the
legislature has adopted the particular law, but not intrude upon the legislature's substantive policy
judgment." Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 YAL.E L.J. 1612, 1625
(1980). Such scrutiny would demand that the judiciary determine "whether the legislature made the
judgments necessary to support the validity of the impairment," and "whether political processes func-
tioned effectively to provide all interested parties with a fair opportunity to argue their cases or to
challenge an adverse decision." Id. at 1645. Judges would find this task much more difficult to per-
form than the relatively simple one required by this Note's procedural approach. The problem of
distinguishing between a "fair" process that just happens to lead to unfortunate results and a mal-
functioning process is characteristic of Ely's participation-reinforcing theory of judicial review. Under
Ely's theory, judges would often evaluate the fairness of a legislative process in light of their view of
the substantive outcomes that process produced. See Bork, The Impossibilty of Finding Welfare Rights
in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695, 700; Cox, Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REv. 700,
710-11 (1981); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1053-56 (1980). The procedural approach, by limiting
discretion, would avoid this admixture of substance and procedure, but still promote fair legislative
decisionmaking.
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to exercise some discretion in defining which agreements fall within the
scope of the contract clause.55 But this exercise of discretion is acceptable,
for judges are choosing a rule to limit their future discretion rather than
making an ad hoc decision.5"
B. Constitutional Arguments for the Procedural Approach
The procedural approach to the contract clause is correct as a matter of
constitutional law. This is true whether one considers the Framers' intent,
the constitutional text, or analogies to other constitutional provisions.
1. The Intent of the Framers
The procedural approach accords with the Framers' view of the con-
tract clause as a device to improve legislative decisionmaking.57 The
Framers adopted the clause in response to the state debtor relief statutes
passed in the 1780's5' by debtors who formed a large part of the popula-
tion. The statutes allowed debtors to reduce their loan obligations in a
variety of ways. 9
Debtor relief statutes were a paradigmatic example of what the Fram-
ers disliked about the state republics. These statutes were able to pass
because the revolutionaries of 1776, believing that small republics would
insure a homogeneity of interests among the people, had not imposed strict
limitations upon the state legislatures.6"
55. For example, judges must decide whether a marriage contract or a corporate charter is a
contract within the meaning of the contract clause. See infra pp. 936-38 (discussing corporate char-
ters); note 97 (discussing marriage contracts).
56. See supra p. 922.
57. In Federalist No. 44, Madison discusses the contract clause with the process-oriented clauses
prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. THE FEDER~ALST No. 44, at 282-83 (J.
Madison) (Rossiter ed. 1961). In arguing for the three clauses, Madison does not distinguish among
them; he considers reasons for adopting one to be reasons for adopting all. The connection among
these clauses is further suggested by the fact that the Framers grouped them together in Article I, § 10
of the Constitution. See also infra note 59 (clauses protecting creditors from state inflation of currency
also placed in Art. I, § 10). The Framers' process-oriented intent is also shown by the fact that the
contract clause was applied only to the states. If the Framers were simply concerned to protect free-
dom of contract, they should have applied the clause to the Federal Government as well. Federalist
No. 10 suggests that they restricted the clause because they had faith in the process of legislative
decisionmaking in large republics.
58. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 454-61 (1934), and sources cited
therein (contract clause inserted in response to state debtor relief); C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTER-
PRETATION OF THE CONsTrIUTON OF THE UNITED STATES 28 (1929) (small farmers and poor
urban dwellers made up "a large debtor class").
59. "State laws were passed suspending the collection of debts. .. , providing for the emission of
paper money, delaying legal proceedings, etc." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
454 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). The Framers sought to protect creditors from state inflation of
the currency through a number of provisions preceding the contract clause in Article I, § 10: "No
State shall ... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a tender
in Payment of Debts." U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cls. 3-5.
60. See G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERIcAN REPuBuc 1776-1787, at 57-58 (1969) (revo-
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The Federalists rejected this belief in homogeneous interests. The
Framers saw the clash between creditors and debtors as strong evidence of
the danger of expropriation by a majority and sought to protect against
such expropriation by limiting the state legislatures. 1 Believing that gov-
ernment should promote the general welfare, rather than the welfare of a
particular group,62 the Framers included the contract clause to prevent the
majority of debtors from abusing the creditor minority." The contract
clause was thus an attempt to insure that state legislation would benefit
all the people.6
2. Analogy to Other Requirements of Prospectivity and Generality in
the Constitution
Although the contract clause has long been analogized to the balancing
doctrine of substantive due process,6 5 the clause should instead be viewed
as one of the many provisions in the Constitution that impose require-
ments of prospectivity and generality upon government.66 The contract
clause permits the states to regulate contracts so long as they meet re-
quirements of prospectivity and generality.67 The Framers placed great
trust in these requirements,' as is evidenced by the many provisions re-
quiring prospectivity and generality that can be found throughout the
Constitution. Such requirements include the bar on federal and state bills
lutionaries believed that small state republics would promote homogeneous populations and temper
factionalism).
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison); see B. WRIGH'T, supra note 3, at 4 ("one of the
principal causes for dissatisfacion with the prevailing state of affairs under the Confederation among
the well-to-do classes was the mass of state legislation which was highly unwelcome to creditors as it
was popular with debtors").
62. See J. ELY, supra note 14, at 79 (Framers envisioned republic "in which the representatives
would govern in the interests of the whole people").
63. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 455-64, and sources cited therein; L. TRIBE, supra note 14, § 9-5,
at 466 (contract clause "included primarily to protect private contracts from improvident majoritarian
impairment").
64. Cf. J. ELY, supra note 14, at 80-100 (many constitutional clauses were attempts to insure
representation of all people).
65. See supra pp. 924-25.
66. The concept of generality (or equality) is often criticized as being vacuous. E.g., Sandalow,
Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L.
REv. 653, 655 (1975); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982). This
criticism of generality is important. Almost all laws are general with respect to some criteria; the
question is what are the relevant criteria. The procedural approach, however, is not plagued by the
vacuity problem. Since the contract clause does not directly mention generality or equality-in con-
trast to the equal protection clause, for example-it is not necessary to decide what criteria to genera-
lize. Rather, by simply applying the clause, it will produce more generalized decisionmaking.
67. See supra pp. 925-28.
68. Madison once observed that "the House of Representatives [is restrained] . . . from oppres-
sive measures [because] . . . they can make no law which will not have its full operation on them-
selves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of society." THE FEDERALiST No. 57, at 352 (U.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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of attainder69 and ex post facto laws;70 the requirement of uniformity in
federal bankruptcy and naturalization law;7 1 the requirement that "[ajll
duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States";7 2 the equal protection clause;78 the prohibition on the taking of
private property without just compensation;74 and the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment .
7
3. Constitutional Arguments for the Damage Remedy
Some might argue that the damage remedy proposed by this Note is
inconsistent with the constitutional text: The contract clause prohibits all
impairments, not just impairments without compensation. This objection
fails for at least two reasons.
First, the procedural approach does prohibit all impairments and thus
is in accord with the constitutional text. The approach merely changes the
remedy for impairments from an injunction to damages. Since the Consti-
tution does not specify a remedy, any remedy that protects contractors'
rights should be permissible;7' providing full compensation for damages
incurred clearly protects those rights.
Second, it has long been recognized that vested contract rights, as a
form of property, are subject to the state's power of eminent domain.
77
69. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cd. 3.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 6.
71. Congress can only "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. See Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 472 n.14 (1982) (Rock Island Transition and Employee
Assistance Act, which applies to only one railroad, violates uniformity; "Framers' intent to achieve
uniformity among the Nation's bankruptcy laws is also reflected in the Contract Clause. Apart from
and independently of the Supremacy Clause, the Contract Clause prohibits the States from enacting
debtor relief laws which discharge the debtor from his obligations... unless the law operates prospec-
tively.") (citations omitted); cf. 3 AM. JuR. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 132, at 1006 (1962) ("Congress
may grant or withold the privilege of naturalization on any grounds, or without any reason, as it sees
fit, the only limitation being the constitutional one of uniformity. This requirement is construed to
mean only that the mode or manner of naturalization prescribed must have uniform operation in all
the states.") (citation omitted). Consequently, citizenship can be conferred by special act. See CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRErATION, S. DoC. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d. Sess. 284 (1972).
72. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
73. U.S. CONS'r. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
76. The distinction between right and remedy is implied by the text of the contract clause itself:
The clause does not prohibit simply impairments, but rather impairments of the obligation of con-
tracts. The clause's focus on the obligation of contracts was once used to permit changes of remedies
that did not affect contractors' rights. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 20 n.17
(1977) (courts no longer rely on remedy/obligation distinction since obligations can now be modified
without necessarily violating the contract clause); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,
200-01 (1819).
77. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); West River Bridge
Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532-33 (1848).
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The damages remedy for contract impairments differs from the exercise of
eminent domain only by making the process of government compensation
operate more smoothly.78 The damages remedy is thus consistent with the
fullest protection of contract rights given their status as property.79
IV. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE, CORPORATE CHARTERS, AND
CORPORATE LAW
The procedural approach to the contract clause treats prospective and
retroactive impairments differently. Retroactive impairments must be ac-
companied by compensation, while prospective impairments do not re-
quire compensation. This distinction between prospective and retroactive
action has implications for corporate law.80
Since Dartmouth College v. Woodward,81 corporate charters have been
contracts under the contract clause.82 Dartmouth College suggested that all
regulations of corporations would be contract impairments. This result
78. See supra note 49.
79. The procedural approach to the contract clause provides the states with the option of retroac-
tively impairing so long as just compensation is paid. Where compensation was owed, it would have to
be sought by the impairment victim in a suit against the state for damages. This appears to raise a
problem, however, since the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar
many damage actions from being brought in federal or state court. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974); Ex parle Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 286-92 (4th ed. 1982) (discussing doctrine of Ex parle Young).
The solution to this problem derives from the obligation of the courts to protect contract clause
rights. If the option of paying compensation were provided to states that were also insulated by sover-
eign immunity, the contract clause would become a nullity and courts would be shirking their duty to
enforce the Constitution. Thus, the Constitution requires that the courts provide the option of paying
just compensation only to states which have also waived their sovereign immunity.
The states thus have a choice when they are deciding whether to impair. In passing a statute that
might affect existing contracts, a state must decide whether to apply the statute prospectively, thereby
exempting existing contracts, or to apply the statute retroactively, thereby waiving its sovereign immu-
nity and incurring the need to compensate. In making this decision, the state will weigh the benefits of
having the statute applied immediately against the costs of paying damages. Without a damage rem-
edy, however, the states would not have this choice-they would be forced to exempt existing contracts
(or to exercise their power of eminent domain). Because the damages remedy provides the states with
the additional option of waiving their sovereign immunity and paying damages, the damages remedy
leaves the states better off than if retroactive impairments could be enjoined.
80. The procedural approach also has implications for public contracts. In United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the impairment of a public
contract is subject to stricter scrutiny than a private contract because a state's self-interest is at stake
when it considers whether to impair a public contract. This Note rejects such an approach. If an
influential corporation persuades the legislature to adjust its contract, this impairment is at least as
suspicious as one made directly for the benefit of the state government. Instead, the procedural ap-
proach prohibits all retroactive impairments because the legislature can predict which minority will
bear the burden of an impairment. Whether the beneficiary is the state itself or one of its favored
private interests is unimportant.
81. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
82. Id. at 643-50; State ex rel. Starkey v. Alaska Airlines, 68 Wash. 2d. 318, 323, 413 P.2d 352,
358 (1966); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1615-19 (5th
ed. 1980); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 951-53 (3d ed. 1983).
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was avoided, however, when the states followed Justice Story's concur-
rence and reserved the power, in corporate charters, to modify those char-
ters subsequently. s Since later charters provided for modifications by the
state, the Court found no impairment."4
While Dartmouth College may in theory still be good law, reservations
of power by the states have overruled it as a practical matter."5 The con-
tract clause no longer acts as a bar to state regulation of corporate
charters.
The procedural approach, however, rejects the principle that states can
reserve the power to regulate contracts. If the states can reserve the right
to modify contracts, the values protected by the contract clause are under-
mined."6 Once the states have reserved the right to modify existing con-
tracts, they are able to take retroactive and particular action. 7 Although
the procedural approach forbids reservations, it nonetheless allows states
to regulate corporations, since the relevant agreements involving the state,
corporations, and shareholders are outside the scope of the contract clause.
There are three agreements recognized in a corporate charter: one be-
tween the state and the corporation, another between the corporation and
the shareholders, and a third among the shareholders."8 The first agree-
ment is public, while the second and third are private. Under the procedu-
ral approach, none of these agreements insulates corporations from
changes in state corporation law.
A. Corporate Charters
While Dartmouth College involved a special charter between the corpo-
ration and the state, corporations are no longer formed by charters 9 but
83. 17 U.S. at 712.
84. See Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478 (1872) (modification of charter upheld as part of
reserved power); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 303.
85. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 82, at 978; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 304
("The result [of the reserve power] is that the practical impact of Dartmouth College has been all but
eliminated . . ").
86. In this respect, the reservation doctrine resembles an unconstitutional condition: It attempts to
achieve indirectly what cannot be achieved directly. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-59 (1968) (state
cannot remove privilege because of citizens' exercise of rights).
87. See supra pp. 926-27.
88. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 82, at 951-55; Note, Limitations on Alteration of
Shareholders' Rights by Charter Amendment, 69 HARv. L. REV. 538, 540 (1956). The charter im-
paired in Dartmouth College is an example of the public corporate contract. The state impaired this
contract by passing legislation that, inter alia, ousted control from the existing trustees. Id. at 625.
Western Foundary Co. v. Wicker, 403 I11. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722 (1949), involved two private corporate
contracts. An amendment voted by 97% of the preferred shareholders cancelling unpaid accumulated
preferred dividends was held to "affect," but not impair, the contracts among the shareholders and
those between the corporation and the shareholders.
89. R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 1-3 (1978).
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rather are created pursuant to state enabling acts.90 Special corporate
charters possessed the characteristics of contract: They involved a specific
agreement between the state and a particular entity, the future corpora-
tion. Enabling acts, in contrast, are general statutes permitting all who
meet certain conditions to operate in the corporate form.9 ' To view ena-
bling acts as contracts therefore requires a strained analysis. Since ena-
bling acts only create the opportunity for organizing in a certain form,
they are more naturally viewed as regulations of business.9 2 If enabling
acts are held to be "contracts," then consistency would require finding
"contracts" throughout much of the regulated economy.9"
No contract, therefore, should be held to exist between the state and
corporations formed pursuant to enabling acts. With respect to such cor-
porations, the Supreme Court should recognize the reality of the past one
hundred and fifty years and overrule the doctrine of Dartmouth College."
Because of the current ability of states to reserve the right to modify char-
ters, this overruling would not upset current expectations.
B. Contracts Involving the Shareholders
Courts should also consider the two private contracts-that between the
corporation and the shareholders, and that among the shareholders-to be
beyond the scope of the contract clause. In the typical case, the contract
clause does not unduly limit the ability of the state to regulate contract
law. Because contracts are not usually of very long duration, the state's
ability to regulate prospectively is effective. Corporations, however, can
exist in perpetuity, so there is no opportunity for the states to regulate
existing corporate contracts prospectively. Thus, private corporate con-
tracts limit the power of the state much more than the usual, private
contract.
Moreover, if private corporate contracts were protected by the contract
clause, the states would have to adopt a prospective regulation limiting the
existence of new corporations to a finite period or leave new corporations
insulated from uncompensated changes in corporation law. But limiting
the lifespan of new corporations would undermine one of the purposes of
90 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 401-04 (McKinney 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §
157.46-.51 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
91. Indeed, the general character of enabling acts has been considered so important that most state
constitutions forbid the creation of corporations by special acts of the legislature. Note, supra note 88,
at 540 n.20 and constitutional provisions cited therein.
92. Dodd, Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. PA. L. REv.
585, 594-95 (1927).
93. The licensing of an attorney, for example, would be a contract. The contract clause might
then prevent the state from later changing the bar's obligations.
94. As long as this overruling is done openly and for all corporate charters, it is consistent with
standards of judicial interpretation presented earlier. See supra pp. 919-22.
Vol. 93: 918, 1984
Contracts Clause
the corporate form-perpetual life.9 5 By interpreting the contract clause
so that the states are forced to eliminate perpetual life, courts would prob-
ably be harming corporate contractors." Both the state and corporate con-
tractors would be better off if corporate contracts were held to be outside
the scope of the contract clause. 7
This argument is bolstered by the existence of competition among the
states. Because incorporations increase state tax revenues and capital is
mobile, states compete to charter corporations by passing laws that at-
tempt to maximize shareholder returns.9" This competition furthers the
values of legislative process that underlie the procedural approach by giv-
ing the states an incentive to protect shareholders. This competition would
be stifled if the contract clause were held to insulate corporate contracts
from statutory alteration.
-Michael B. Rappaport
95. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 82, at 21-22.
96. We can be reasonably confident that corporate shareholders benefit more from perpetual life
than they are harmed by having their charters subject to state regulation, since they could have elimi-
nated both by conducting business as a non-corporate entity. Of course, there are other benefits to the
corporate form besides perpetual life. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 82, at 21-22. The
benefits to being protected by the contract clause, however, are greatly reduced, if not made negative,
by the existence of competition among the states for incorporations. See infra pp. 936-37.
97. These points concerning perpetual life can be subsumed under a more general. principle.
Modern theories of contract have distinguished two types of contract-classical and relational con-
tracts. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L.
& ECON. 223, 236-38 (1980). Classical contracts-the more traditional kind-are of short duration,
and have the terms of the contract largely specified in the document. Relational contracts, on the other
hand, are of longer duration with vague terms to be given content as circumstances unfold. The
contract clause makes much more sense when applied to classical contracts than to relational ones. As
mentioned above, contracts of short duration do not greatly restrict the power of the state to regulate.
Classical contracts also involve much more reliance on the specific terms of the document, which an
impairment would tend to upset. The jurisprudence of the contract clause implicitly recognizes the
relative inappropriateness of the clause to non-classical contracts by holding marriage contracts be-
yond the scope of the contract clause. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Flora v. Flora, 166
Ind. App. 620, 337 N.E.2d 846, 851 (1975). The courts should extend this recognition to corporate
contracts.
98. R. WINTER, supra note 89, at 7-16.
